Centralised Digital ID databases often become prime targets for cybercriminals because they store irreplaceable biometric data like fingerprints and iris scans. For example, India’s Aadhaar, the largest such system, suffered multiple breaches between 2017 and 2018. These breaches compromised over a billion citizens’ records and enabled fraud and extortion. Furthermore, in 2023, hackers leaked over 815 million records, exposing how biometrics—unlike passwords—cannot be reset and leaving individuals constantly vulnerable to identity theft.

Digital IDs can accidentally —or deliberately—exclude vulnerable populations from crucial services like healthcare and welfare. For example, in India, biometric failures in the Aadhaar system have led to starvation deaths, such as an elderly man denied rations due to mismatched fingerprints, affecting millions in rural areas. Similarly, Uganda’s Ndaga Muntu system has prevented pregnant women from accessing medical care, violating fundamental rights to life.

Error-prone biometrics influenced by factors like ageing or physical labour, like unreadable fingerprints due to 30 years of extreme work in construction, can make individuals “invisible” to the system. In Jharkhand, India, Aadhaar’s authentication failure rate reached 49% in 2016, blocking access to jobs, benefits, and travel for the poorest citizens. These systemic flaws disproportionately impact marginalised groups, infringing on their right to societal participation.

By pushing the integration with AI and data analytics, Digital IDs provide the platform for constant monitoring of citizens’ activities. For example, China’s social credit system, linked to national digital IDs, checks behaviour and imposes penalties like travel bans on “untrustworthy” individuals. Likewise, Pakistan authorities blocked IDs to suppress protesters, transforming such tools into mechanisms of authoritarian control and censorship.

Many Digital ID programs start without proper laws, which can lead to data misuse and programs growing beyond their original purpose. India’s Aadhaar system was launched in 2010 without strong privacy laws, making what was meant to be voluntary enrollment practically mandatory for things like banking and education. The Supreme Court’s 2017 recognition of privacy as a fundamental right arrived too late to prevent widespread profiling and consent violations.

Outsourcing verification increases vulnerabilities and fraud, as shown by the 2024 AU10TIX breach, which exposed millions of IDs, selfies, and passports used by platforms like PayPal and Coinbase, sparking a $400 million extortion surge. Similarly, India’s Signzy KYC leak dumped Aadhaar biometrics onto the dark web, enabling irreversible identity fraud. Source

Mandating Digital IDs for basic necessities creates coercive conditions that exploit vulnerability. Kenya’s Huduma Namba was struck down by courts in 2022 for lacking privacy protections, yet it continues to exclude minorities from welfare. In South Africa, the courts ruled that authorities unconstitutionally blocked 2 million IDs, highlighting arbitrary rights deprivations without due process.

Digital IDs can systematise bias by revoking or denying status to targeted groups. For example, in Myanmar, a China-backed system denied IDs to Rohingya Muslims under the 1982 Citizenship Law. This facilitated exclusion and genocide-like conditions.. Similarly, Colombia’s digital checks have annulled migrant documents. These actions stranded thousands and codified discrimination under security pretexts.

Complaint mechanisms in Digital ID systems are often faulty and inadequate, therefore leaving errors uncorrected. For example, South Africa’s 2023 court ruling deemed mass ID blocking unconstitutional. Yet millions still faced blocked accounts and job losses due to shady appeals processes. Likewise, in Paraguay’s digital rollout, the absence of robust remedies allows constant exclusion without any accountability.

In unstable regimes, Digital IDs increase chaos because they enable data weaponisation. For instance, El Salvador’s 2024 biometric leak exposed data for 80% of the population, including facial photos and IDs. This led to more fraud and violence. Similarly, Thailand’s 2024 agency breach resulted in 200,000 records being sold on the dark web. However, victims received little help, even though fines were issued.

These documented failures—from Aadhaar’s leaks to Myanmar’s exclusions—underscore that Digital IDs prioritise control over rights. A possible future adoption of Digital ID in Western countries will push us to trade privacy for convenience. This shift will encourage a surveillance society where a citizen’s autonomy becomes compromised.

We can both agree, friend, that centralised identity systems enable unchecked government access to personal data, threatening individual sovereignty. Public institutions lack integrity, and the pandemic eroded the public trust in their motives. Digital ID tools will likely deepen social divides and curtail freedoms.

Biometric databases, in the wrong hands, will annihilate privacy and dignity. Let’s not ignore this warning. We must unite our voices and urge immediate action to prioritise citizens’ privacy. This is more important than the technological ambitions of authoritarian leaders who could oppress from the shadows at the press of a button.